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Public administration as an art is defined in the Ghanaian context regarding decentralization and public
officials’ accountability. It examines decentralization, local elections and empowerment. While the
paper advocates for regional and district level elections, it uses the literature to argue that local
representatives are more accessible to their locals. It questions the current appointment practices by
the central government, which has become more partisan than originally intended in the Local
Government Act. To affirm the democratic environment of politics in Ghana, it calls for constitutional
amendment regarding decentralization and local government elections.
Key words: Public administration, decentralization, public officials, accountability, local government elections.
INTRODUCTION
As the first sub-Saharan African country to attain political
independence since 1957 from Great Britain, the
Ghanaian proclivity for experimentation on issues
including social, economic and political initiatives,
according to Pellow and Chazan (1986) and Ayee (2008),
has turned the country “into a veritable laboratory for the
investigation of different approaches to endemic African
problems” (Pellow and Chazan, 1986: 210). One of these
problems is local participation in political decision making
in the country’s democratic process (Antwi-Boasiako and
Bonna, 2009).
Local accountability becomes effective where local
leaders are elected by their own people hence the
importance of decentralization. “Ghana’s decentralization
policy from 1988 to date combines elements of political,
administrative and fiscal decentralization,” among other
things that seek to promote effective governance at the
local level (Ayee, 2008: 234).
This paper provides an overview of theoretical
considerations and ambiguity underlying the argument for
decentralization followed by a brief history of Ghana’s
political system. It then addresses the issues of effective
public administrators (leaders) and decentralization. It
concludes by making a case for local government
elections in the various electoral constituencies: districts
and regions, while recommendations are made for
constitutional amendments to allow locals to elect their
own public officials. To understand the role of public

officials in the Ghanaian political environment, an attempt
is made here to define public administration.
DEFINING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN GHANA
The Ghanaian political heads of state, from the first president, Kwame Nkrumah (1957) to John Evans Atta-Mills
(2009) have different leadership skills that affirm the
diverse administrative styles of public administrators. This
non-surprisingly diverse nature in public administration is
normative in its definition focusing mainly on public
interest (King and Chilton, 2009). Each one of the
leaders, including those not mentioned in this paper, has
had his fair share of public criticisms of maladministration
given their administrative styles, yet all of them are more
likely to vow that their actions were in the interest of the
public. Ghana, a country of only 54 years of political
freedom, gaining political independence from the British
colonial rule, has had four different constitutions;
however, 21 out of the 54 years of the country was ruled
under military decrees1 leaving only 33 years of
constitutional administration in Ghana.
The literature on public administration and its definition
has different interpretations of the field (Stillman, 2010;
1

The first military administration in Ghana was from 1966-1969, second
military administration 1972-1979, and the third and longest was from 19811992.
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King and Chilton, 2009). Public administrators are
engaged in technicalities but unfortunately, some
Ghanaians, if not most of them, lack the knowledge to
fully comprehend the role of public administrators. Moreover, Ghanaians are not alone as “empirical descriptions
from an external perspective,” studies have shown that
“no one really sees the big picture” in its definition (King
and Chilton, 2009: 29, 1). One can therefore argue that a
lot of the citizens do not understand the details of the
legal duties of their leaders operations. In addition to
budgetary preparations and job classifications, public
administrators are equally concerned with the development of human resources and achieving the goals of the
people.
Public administration, like any other academic
discipline, is not isolated but intertwined “with the critical
dilemmas confronting an entire society”. Its diverse
nature makes it difficult for ordinary Ghanaians who are
not part of an administration to focus on the goals of that
administration if those goals are not clearly defined.
Many studies including, but not limited to, King and
Chilton (2009), Grover Starling (2001), McSuite (2002),
William (1995), Robert (1995) and James and Donald
(1996), for decades have offered different definitions of
public administration (Stillman, 2010: 2 - 4). Cropf (2008:
8), citing Dwight Waldo, also agrees “no single, and
authoritative definition of public administration is
possible”.
For example, Grover (1998: 10) stated that public
administration is the process by which resources are
marshaled and then used to cope with the problems
facing a political community, but David (1986: 6) sees it
as “the use of managerial, political and legal theories and
processes to fulfill legislative, executive and judicial
governmental mandates for the provision of regulatory
and service functions for the society as a whole or for
some segments of it”.
Leonard (1955: 3), considered as one of the pioneers in
the field, has a broader definition. He defines it as “consisting of all those operations having for their purpose the
fulfillment or enforcement of public policy”. Given the
complexities of leadership and public administration in
Ghana, it becomes more confusing if the administration
of local communities is laid only on the shoulders of the
central government. The logical definition of public
administration, the author argues, is derived from
differing understanding of sagacity or different premises.
To the Ghanaians, despite how ill-defined the field is,
public administration must be seen in the areas including
transparency, accountability and decentralization.
Public administration should be a collective effort to
manage the human resources for effective implementation of public policies within the budgetary constraints of
that community. It is, therefore, important that public
administrators are elected to serve the people within a
given community.
Drawing from the literature, public administration is the
management of the scarce resources, that is, financial,
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human and material of a community by elected and
unelected public officials to benefit the said community,
region or district. Public administration is an art, which
strategically combines these resources to maximize their
utilization in the interest of the citizens within a governed
jurisdiction. Contrary to the scientific2 argument for public
administration, the field, some have argued, only
provides a focus and not a locus (Henry, 1975). For
public administrators to be seen as effective and
productive, their area of administration must be politically
and clearly defined hence the importance of
decentralization.
One of the essential components of democratic
societies, which has being adopted in emerging democracies is decentralization to make their administrative
systems more efficient (Dillinger, 1994). In Ghana, as
Ayee (2008: 233) noted, since independence, succeeding
governments in Ghana have preoccupied themselves
with decentralization because they regarded it as a
necessary condition for not only the socio-economic
development of the country, but also as a way of
achieving their political objectives such as the
recentralization of power and legitimacy”.
The large body of scholarly literature on decentralization provides conflicting analyses on effective public
administration (Faguet, 2008; Kim et al., 2005). In Ghana,
politicians who advocate for decentralization are
sometimes skeptical of giving or sharing power with their
subordinates as the concept is either not well defined or
understood in the Ghanaian context.
As Gyimah-Boadi3 observed that even though local
governments are given autonomy over finance, control
from the central government had taken away that power
from the local people. He maintains that the districts do
not have the capacity to manage their finance, and even
the District Assembly Common Fund is controlled by the
central government. Gyimah-Boadi noted that local
government policy in Ghana had brought developments
since its inception in 1988, but the situation was
aggravated by the total hegemony exercised by the
central government.
In fact, the literature on decentralization, according to
constitutional law specialists, tries to avoid the problem of
confining decentralization to legal models of government
relations (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: l, 19). The authors
define it along the principal distinction between unitary
and federal based systems like federation, confederation,
unions and leagues. Decentralization, according to this
2

The author strongly argues that public administration is an art and not science.
This argument is not the focus of the paper and hopes to discuss this
extensively in another article but for now this argument is beyond the scope of
this paper. To have an idea of the scientific argument for public administration
see Nicholas Henry, 1975, Public Administration Review. 35 (4) 378-386.
3
Professor Gyimah-Boadi discussed the conflicting gains of decentralization at
a
symposium
in
2009
in
Ghana.
See
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=16
2875 Retrieved on July 25, 2010. He also noted the lack of smooth
implementation of decentralization policies.
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school of thought, is a community having legally specified
sovereignty over the identified public sector tasks in a
well-defined territorial jurisdiction (Cohen and Peterson,
1999: 19 - 22).
Ghana’s political structure falls into the unitary political
category, where the executive holds the power of
nominating district and regional leaders. Hence, the
governed in these units have no choice but to live with
the selection of the executive. The practice of public
administration comes in many shades as the literature
struggles to identify a universal acceptable definition.
Since the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992 - present),
despite the accusations of electoral frauds by the two
leading political parties (New Patriotic Party [NPP] and
National Democratic Congress [NDC]) in the country,
Ghana, as a country, has enjoyed five successful general
elections. This feat, undeniably, makes Ghana a more
politically and economically stable country compared to
some of its neighbors over the same period (Callmachi,
2008).
The irony of Ghana’s political system is that
notwithstanding the form of government of the country
(military or democratic), the role of the executive remains
the same regarding the appointments of the heads of
local governments. This practice, arguably, provides little
or no local power to the grassroots. It therefore,
minimizes the otherwise political difference between a
military and democratic regime.
This paper argues for a constitutional amendment to
allow a stronger local government empowerment through
local government elections. It maintains that by
continuing the current process where regional and district
administrators are appointed by the central government,
the locals are deprived of the opportunity to elect leaders
of their choice. For example, the original intent of
decentralization and the appointment of local public
officials have given way to intense partisan politics.
Gyimah-Boadi4 recently admitted that the non-partisan
concept of decentralization has “burbled with party
politics”. He further explained that 30% of the government
appointees to the District Assembly, according to the
Local Government Act [of 1988], should be technocrats
and experts, but surveys conducted by CDD-Ghana in
2005 and 2007, revealed that most of the appointees
were political activists.
Additionally, this argument “stems largely from the idea
that decentralization will promote better governance as
local officials are supposedly more aware of, and more
responsive to, local needs” (Ducan, 2007: 713). Decentralization, as has been argued by proponents, is more
likely to encourage and promote not only democracy, but
also provides locals with the chance to have control
4

See an editorialized version of Professor Gyimah-Boadi’s speech on
“Reflection on Ghana's Decentralisation Programme: Progress, Stagnation or
Retrogression”
retrieved
from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=16
2875 on July 19, 2010.

over their own governance.
THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING AND AMBIGUITIES
OF DECENTRALIZATION
It is often easier to document and discuss the
shortcomings of decentralization, public administration
and governance in Ghana than in theory. There is a
complex notion of subalternity pertinent to any academic
enterprise, which concerns itself with historically determined relationships (Ghadi, 1998: 2) of any one concept
in abstraction and its implementation. The concept of
decentralization and its interpretations have become a
battleground for variety of disciplines and theories.
However, scholars of public administration including
political analysts often discuss theoretical shortcomings
and lack of development with very little incorporation of
the effect of that theory or model (7 - 22). Dubin (1969:
6) argues that developing a theory must have a human
experience. He posits “the need for theories lies in the
human behavior of wanting to impose order on unordered
experiences, which is not ordered by nature hence the
experiences may be…theorized about, in very different
ways”.
As a solution to ease regional conflicts (Laksono and
Topatimasang, 2003; Permana, 2002), decentralization is
a process where central government transfers political,
fiscal and administrative powers to lower levels in an
administrative and territorial hierarchy (Duncan, 2007:
713). In theory, it holds regional leaders accountable to
their constituents instead of the central government.
Decentralization is defined in a variety of ways by the
degree of delegation and autonomy of local actors
(Assibey-Mensah, 2000; Fesler, 1965; Werlin, 2003),
which presents conflicts and dilemmas in the concept and
its impact (Faguet, 1997; Hommes, 1995). Empirical
literature does not agree on the benefits of decentralization as different studies are poles apart in their
conclusions. For example, while Olowu and Wunsch
(1990), Putnam (1993) and World Bank (1994) argue that
decentralization makes governments more responsive,
Faguet (2008), Tanzi (1995), Prud’homme (1995) and
Samoff (1990) think otherwise. However, the 1992 constitutional recognition for decentralization has renewed
interest in political decentralization in Ghana, as locals
often reject leaders appointed by the central government
(Ayisi, 2008).
While economists focus on efficiency and equity, public
administration scholars are also interested in the
distribution of power, responsiveness, transparency, and
accountability (Klingner and Nalbandian, 1998). The
literature affirms that macroeconomic function must
remain with the central government, suggesting that local
governments must deal with program specificities for
local demand. Oates (1993) analysis of over 50 countries
confirmed a positive relationship between decentralization and economic growth.
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The theoretical argument for fiscal decentralization
traces back to Madison and Rousseau, in the 17th and
18th centuries (Wolman, 1990), though they had different
reasons for supporting decentralization. For example, in
the Federalist Papers No. 39 (FP39), Madison argues
that leaders must derive their powers “directly… from the
great body of the people,” which means that powerful
locals and “not inconsiderable…handful of …nobles are
exercising their oppression by a delegation of their
powers” (Rossiter, 1961: 241). Though decentralization is
not specifically mentioned in FP39, Madison believes that
the people must be given the mandate to elect their
leaders as a way of “composing the distinct and
independent regions, to which they respectively belong”
(Rossiter, 1961: 243).
Rousseau (176: 59 - 50) also favored small government. To him, “rulers overburdened with business, see
nothing for themselves: clerks govern” (1762,). Using the
Poland political system, Rousseau, who advocated for a
political reformation, instructed the poles to perfect and
extend the authority of their provincial parliaments to
avoid the dangers of larger state bureaucracies
(Rousseau, 1772: 183-184). By this assertion, Rousseau
was insisting on the essentials of local repre-sentation
(decentralization). According to Wolman (1990), small
democratic (local) governments were the funda-mental
hopes of the people, as most of them distrusted the
activities of the central government. The debate for
political decentralization is inconclusive in the literature
as both proponents and opponents provide different
findings in their studies (for example, Putnam, 1993;
Prud’homme, 1995).
In discussing the politics of decentralization, therefore,
it should be noted that the concept goes together with
centralized government power. Though decentralization
is primarily a strategy for transferring authority and
responsibility from the central government to sub-national
(regional and district) levels of government (Ostrom,
1989; Stone, 1997), many African leaders only adopt the
concept in theory but fail to delegate powers to the
districts and regions. Some studies maintain that the
concept is not easily defined; therefore, it has several
dimensions and wide variety types of institutional
restructuring, which encompasses the term decentralization. Though some scholars see it as a simple term,
they argue that its simplistic generalization is sometimes
too broad. According to Fesler (1965:536), decentralization is a term of rich conceptual and empirical meaning,
“which can designate static fact and dynamic process
and it can refer to pure ideal-type and moderate
incremental change” when the rational theory of
decentralization is understood in all compartments.
DECENTRALIZATION:
AND DELEGATION

POLITICAL,

DEVOLUTION

For the purpose of this paper, a brief three-stage (political
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decentralization, devolution and delegation) definition of
decentralization is provided based on the degree of
discretion and responsibility delegated by the central
executive. The literature shows that developing countries
have addressed decentralization in different ways, often
reflecting the national history, politics and culture for
administrative and economic efficiency; but more
importantly is the role of district and regional leaders in
focusing on the needs of their constituencies. However,
the concept of the decentralization/development dichotomy has not yielded the desired results in other parts of
the world (Kettl, 2000), including Ghana. This analysis
defines decentralization as an electoral devolution to
enable citizens at the grassroots (that is, locals) to elect
their own leaders void of any direct input from the central
government.
Political decentralization
Political decentralization, which is manifested in the
degree and types of political autonomy and accountability, is of greater importance to this study. A fully
developed system of political decentralization in Ghana is
a situation where local people in the districts and regions
elect their own legislative and executive personnel so that
those units will be able to hire, pay and dismiss
administrative personnel without reference to central
authority.
Political decentralization gives citizens and their elected
representatives the political power in the public policy
process. This form of decentralization is associated with
pluralistic politics and representative government, but it
can also support democratization by giving citizens or
their representatives, more influence in the formulation
and implementation of policies (Furniss, 1974; Harrigan,
1994) in their areas. Political decentralization often
requires constitutional or statutory reforms. Such a reform
may force elected officials in the constituencies to be
more accountable to the electorates instead of satisfying
the wishes of a distant executive. Administratively,
political decentralization empowers citizens to “play a
larger role in regional governance… [including] conflict
resolution” (Duncan, 2007: 727). This empowerment,
unfortunately, is lacking in the current political process
where the executive has the exclusive power to appoint
district and regional leaders. The literature affirms that
political appointees are subject to the whims (Klingner
and Nalbandian, 1998: 43) of the central government.
Generally, empirical studies tend to favor political
decentralization over centralization in terms of innovation,
leadership accountability and responsiveness (Taylor,
2003: 231). This assertion, according to Taylor, has
become a sort of accepted wisdom among social
scientists. Nevertheless, given the theoretical support by
social scientists, a general correlation between political
decentralization and innovation is yet to be firmly
established. Treisman (2007) argues that self-governing
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is the core aspect of modern democratic nations where
the people must elect their own leaders. To Treisman,
political decentralization is good for its facilitating
features. These features include, but are not limited to,
administrative efficiency, checks on central government
abuses and policy experimentation. While decentralization satisfies geographically concentrated ethnic
groups, it could also prompt locally elected officials to be
unsupportive to the central government by “playing the
ethnic card” to distort fiscal distribution. Political
decentralization often leads to deconcentration.
Deconcentration
Deconcentration is a form of network of central power
and sub-state institutions comprising the elites of those
constituencies. As Assibey (2000) puts it, deconcentration is a power sharing strategy where power is transferred from central operating agencies to regional ones.
The central government under such a concept uses the
local governments to improve efficiency and effectiveness of delivering services (Cheema and Rondinelli,
1983: 79 - 81). Rondinelli (1981) argues that deconcentration takes place as long as the central government
disperses certain responsibilities of services to the
regional and local governments.
Delegation
The final form of decentralization discussed in this paper
is delegation, which seeks to transfer services and
responsibilities from central government agencies to
specialized organizations with some degree of operating
autonomy (Ayee, 2000). Apart from devolution, which is
expected to stand on its own, the other forms of
decentralization that have already been discussed tend to
overlap in the execution of responsibilities between the
centralized authority and district or regional representtatives. The theory of decentralization obviously presents
a problem for a country with a unitary political system like
Ghana because of the system’s political and legal
structures.
The NPP under John Agyekum Kufour’s presidency,
like its predecessor, Jerry J. Rawlings, promoted the
decentralization concept as one of its administrative
goals, but how an administration would choose one
strategy over another remains a matter of preference and
interest of that administration. Though the Ghana
Constitution provides the structure of decentralization in
Ghana (Ghana Constitution: Chapter 20: Article 240, A –
E), it does not allow citizens at the grassroots to elect
their political leaders. For example, Article 243 [1] states
that regional and district political leaders shall be
appointed by the President. Undeniably, democratic
deficits are associated with the ongoing decentralization

reforms in Ghana. One could argue that decentralization
has not succeeded since it does not appear to adopt the
characteristics discussed in the literature. The concept of
political decentralization in Ghana has negative implications to the executive since some districts have over
the years resisted the appointments and nominations of
their leaders by the central authority (Ayisi, 2008).
DECENTRALIZATION
IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

GHANA:

A

BRIEF

A discussion of the complexities facing Ghana’s political
leadership including the Kufour and Mills administrations
regarding decentralization is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, some understanding of the concept from
a historical background may help to explain the quandary
of the executive. The literature on this topic considers the
colonial British indirect rule through the local chiefs as the
genesis of decentralization in the then Gold Coast (now
Ghana). Decentralization thus became a political tool for
the British through the chiefs and their elders to reinforce
the wishes of the British government (Antwi-Boasiako
and Bonna, 2009). As Bamfo (2000) and Rathbone
(2000) noted, those chiefs who cooperated with the
British were rewarded and the uncooperative ones were
punished. Such an authoritative implementation of the
concept created fear among the chiefs and their subjects
(that is, the locals).
Ghana’s political independence in March, 1957 did little
to change the political structures established by the
colonizers. As a result, many studies have described
post-colonial decentralization as ineffective, in which
regime change through military coups became the order
of the day after Kwame Nkrumah was ousted in 1966. It
was during the mid-1970s under Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu
Acheampong’s military regime that the government tried
to empower the locals (Nkrumah, 2000). The history of
contemporary decentralization in spite of Acheampong’s
attempt is credited to the Provisional National Defense
Council (PNDC) regime under Jerry John Rawlings’
administration (Assibey-Mensah, 2000). Assibey-Mensah
(2000: 17) argues that after the passage of the 1987
Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207), 110 District
Councils and their respective District Assemblies (DAs)
were set up to ensure local participation in the decision
making process. This led to the formation of the defunct
People’s Defense Committees (PDCs) in communities to
identify each area’s needs instead of relying on the
central government to make every decision and try to
solve local problems from the ‘castle’ (Office of the
National Government). Research shows that the PDC
concept created grassroots interest in local administration
as district elections during the PNDC regime were the
highest ever recorded for the decades in the late 1980s.
Assibey-Mensah (2000: 17) also noted that official
reports indicated that 58.9% of registered Ghanaian
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voters cast their ballots in the local elections, and the
turnout was the highest of any district-level election over
the past 30 years.
The PDCs, made up of local self-identified defenders of
the PNDC revolution, effectively took over local government responsibilities, though they were often limited to
mobilizing the implementation of local self-help projects,
while the deconcentrated ministries played a more
significant role. Ayee (1994) notes that despite the
PNDC’s rhetoric, its interest in decentralization reflected
in that of previous regimes, thus, a curiosity in the
administrative decentralization of central government and
not the devolution of political authority to the local level.
Additionally, Ayee (2000: 49 - 50) perceives a key feature
of local governance, through the PDCs for example, in
the pre-1988 period as a dual hierarchical structure in
which central and local government institutions operated
in parallel, but with encroachment at times by betterresourced central government on the roles and responsibilities of under-resourced local revolutionary activists.
The PDC concept of decentralization became a legitimate
revolutionary political institution under the PNDC military
administration. Since some studies have argued that
local participation ensures more direct form of democracy
in which the voices of ordinary people can be heard more
easily, the PNDC used the PDCs and Workers Defense
Committees (WDCs) to make decisions in the local
communities and workplaces. These institutions, PDCs
and WDCs, were to take part in the decision making process at the grassroots in the rural areas and workplaces
in urban areas, respectively. Given the theoretical
understanding of decentralization, it was believed that
these groups would unlock the virtue and intelligence of
the populace at the grassroots level and would foster
good government and promote social capital (Debrah,
2009: 281).
Understanding the politics of decentralization from
the PNDC era
The military administration of Rawlings planned to transfer both fiscal and some political responsibilities from
Accra (National Capital of Ghana) to all the districts and
municipalities in the country. This move centered on
Local Government Law decreed under the PNDC
administration and was aimed to introduce fiscal balance
between the central government and the districts. By
transferring power to the districts, the PNDC administration was making government more responsive to local
communities to placate critics of the centralized military
rule. For example, according to Adedeji (200: 1),
Ghanaians were not happy with Rawlings’ PNDC administration during the late 1980s. He stated “objections to
the authoritarianism of Rawlings government, which
lacked structure for grassroots participation, were widespread despite rhetoric to the contrary by the PNDC”.
The PNDC government introduced a legislative reform,
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the Local Government Law (LGL) (PNDC Law 207) in
1988, which led to the creation of 110 designated districts
within Ghana’s ten regions, with non-partisan District
Assembly (DA) elections held for the first time in 1988/89
under the PNDC, and subsequently every four years
(1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). The law provides in part
that two-thirds of the DA members are elected on an
individual non-partisan basis and one-third is appointed
by the central government including a ‘district chief
executive’ (DCE) for each of the 110 districts.
The 1988 LGL was to promote grassroots, citizen participation and ownership of the machinery of government
by devolving power, competence and means power at
the district level. The PNDC decentralization exercise,
through the PDCs, was to satisfy the demands of the
revolution and was not in the interest of democratic
principles. Ayee (2000) argues that the decentralization
policy under the second Rawlings regime had selfserving motives. The PNDC’s decentralization policy is
therefore seen by critics as an effort to increase the
legitimacy of Rawlings’ second revolution, which ruled
Ghana from 1982 through 1992.
The dance: Constitution and decentralization
Following over a decade of military dictatorship under J.
J. Rawlings (1981 -1991), the 1992 Ghana Constitution
provided a transition from a military rule to multi-party
democracy at the national level, which also authorized
the 1988 LGL reforms. It consolidated the aim of
decentralization within the overall context of a liberal
democratic constitution, yet essential democratic
elements remained compromised, especially through the
retention of presidential appointments instead of local
elections in the districts. The objective of decentralization
was laid out specifically in the 1992 Ghana Constitution
(chapter 20) under decentralization and local government. Here, the ‘constitution’ states categorically in
Article 240 1 “local government and administration [are
to] be decentralized, and that the functions, powers,
responsibilities and resources should be transferred from
the central government [Castle] to the local government”
constituencies (Article 240 [2])”.
The independent role of the local government, with
discretionary powers at the grassroots, was subjected to
a provision in Article 240 [2b], which states that measures
should be taken to enhance the capacity of local government authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and
execute policies in respect of matters affecting local
people.
The principles of participation in local government and
accountability to the locals were also emphasized in
Article 240 [2e], which states that to ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in particular
local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be
afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their
governance. There is a contradiction here. For example,
during the eras of Rawlings and Kufour’s administrations,
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the locals rejected their leaders, but the executive
rejected the cry of citizens at the grassroots (locals)
(Ghana News Agency, 2005).
It is not uncommon for the central government to
appoint someone the people have rejected in parliamentary elections to become the senior administrator in
the same constituency. In 2005, several of such
appointments were made and the trend did not change.
Critics argue that in the first place, [such practice]
amounts to undermining democracy, because these were
the people who were rejected by their own constituents at
an election and the government is recycling them by
using the 'back door' to now impose them on the people
as their political heads (Ghana News Agency, 2005b).
Without a doubt, the democratic intent in the decentralization requirements is provided in Article 35[6d]: The
state shall take appropriate measures by decentralizing
the administrative and financial machinery of government
to the regions and districts and by affording all possible
opportunities to the people to participate in decisionmaking at every level of national life and in government.
The 1992 Ghana Constitution preserved some of the
PNDC 1988 reforms of non-partisan local level elections
and presidential powers of appointment. A District
Assembly shall comprise 70% elected members and 30%
of the members appointed by the President in
consultation with traditional authorities and other interest
groups in the district (Article 242[d]). For example, the
appointment of a ‘district chief executive’ (DCE) by the
President is retained with at least the approval of 66% of
the DA members (Article 243[1]). The DCE is the political
head of the local executive, centrally involved in decisionmaking, with a ‘district coordinating director’ (DCD) as the
highest ranking civil servant. Additionally, after the
elections, the assemblies, once in session, will become
the highest political authorities in the districts (OwusuAnsah, 1989: 215)
The Ghana Constitution also provides guidelines for the
local government on finances and clearly states that the
DAs should have sound financial bases with adequate
and reliable sources of revenue [Article 240(2)], with an
attempt to secure this position through the establishment
of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). This is
determined annually by the legislature but with appropriation “not less than 5% of the total revenues of Ghana”
[Article 252(2)]. The proceeds of the DACF are divided
between DAs on the basis of a revenue sharing formula
approved by the legislative. Article 240 provides reforms
of the civil service with local government authority, which
states that, as far as practicable, the persons in the
service of the local government shall be subjected to
effective control of the local authorities [2][d]). The irony
of Article 240 is that it is focused extensively on the
districts with no mention of the responsibilities of regional
leaders. For Ghana, to benefit from the decentralization
concept, it would largely depend on the vision of the
leadership and a constitutional amendment to empower

the electorates.
DECENTRALIZATION: ONE CONCEPT WITH MANY
INTERPRETATIONS
Ghana’s political history since independence lacks
administrative continuity. The road to Ghana’s independence was brutal and nasty as the British did not want to
relinquish its power over the occupied colonies. The
military and democratic mix of Ghana’s political system
since independence has given leaders a cause to be
cautious of how they share power at the regional and
district levels.
Since the military ousted the Convention People’s Party
(CPP) under Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in 1966,
democratically elected leaders like Dr. K. A. Busia (1969 1972), Dr. Hilla Liman (1979 - 1981), Jerry J. Rawlings
(1992 - 2000) and John A. Kufour (2001 - 2008) have
always been suspicious of individuals who could
influence the military in coup plots. Busia and Liman
became victims of military coups, while the Kufour
administration accused some individuals of plotting to
overthrow his administration. For example, several media
reports quoted President Kufour as saying “ex-President
Rawlings was planning a coup to topple his government”
(Enquirer, 2006).
How does this play into decentralization? Given the
above discussion, leaders tend to delegate responsibilities and government duties to individuals who are
loyal to a ruling party instead of allowing the grassroots to
elect their own leaders to ensure security. It could be
argued that such appointments do not consider the
interest of the citizens, who oftentimes reject the
presidential appointees.
On four different occasions (1966, 1972, 1979 and
1981), the Ghana Constitution was suspended as a result
of military coups. It can be argued that such political
instability has forced democratic leaders to act like
military leaders where the executive tends to hold on to
power, while the regional leaders become extensions of
the executive branch without any significant power.
Democratic and undemocratic changes of government in
Ghana affect local political structures. For example, the
fall of the Nkrumah’s CPP saw the collapse of the ‘young
pioneers’ (youth wings of the CPP), while the PDCs
vanished with the defunct PNDC as a grassroot political
structure.
Ghana’s political history shows that decentralization is
a concept used by governments to reflect the leaders’
political ideologies as seen under the Nkrumah, Rawlings
and Kufour administrations, but the actual implementation
of the concept under any of these leaders is far from how
the literature defines it. Politically, whether civilian or
military, the executive has always appointed favorites as
political leaders in the regions and districts with little input
from the local electorates.
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LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY: MAKING A CASE FOR
THE LOCAL ELECTIONS
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that local involvement in
the political process through elections ensures selfempowerment as locals gain more political power. Such
empowerment translates to locals not only trusting their
elected officials but also have a higher sense of political
efficacy about local citizens’ issues (382 -384). Despite
the mixed conclusions of the impact of decentralization in
the literature, as the concept has both “political and
technical tradeoffs” (Ayee, 2005: 255), Ghana is on
record as chalking some progress in implementing
decentralization. Therefore, allowing locals to elect their
own leaders or public officials makes government more
accountable to the local populations (Duncan, 2007:711)
and more responsive to local concerns. As Debrah
(2009) and Gregory (2007) noted, an analysis of Western
political philosophical ideology affirms and underpins the
centrality of local accountability in democratic political
systems. This western political philosophy, in part, was in
line with Owusu-Ansah’s argument that the local elected
officials will become the highest political authorities in the
districts where they would be responsible and held
accountably for their actions. The author maintained that
this was the ultimate goal of the PNDC administration
(Owusu-Ansah, 1989: 215). Regional and district
elections would ensure accountability, which is historically rooted in steward of public trust (Kearns, 1995: 7).
To Kearns, accountability is not just a “formal process
and channels for reporting to a higher authority but
involves a wider spectrum of local expectations and
performance standards that are used to judge the
performance, responsiveness and even morality of the
elected local officials”. It is against this background in the
literature that this paper calls for districts and regional
elections in Ghana.
In any matured democracy, the people govern themselves or play a significant role in the governing process
through elections. The theory of modern representative
democratic systems provides that the core of popular
participation is voting, therefore, an elected candidate will
represent the voice of the governed.
The gap created through legal and constitutional
backing for not electing DCEs and RMs in Ghana has
been highlighted in this paper. The actual challenge is on
government (Parliament) to realize this loophole in the
Ghanaian Constitution by legally and procedurally
amending it for voters in the districts to elect individuals
of their choice. A weak democratic constitution, one could
argue, is better than the strongest authoritative decree
since the former avails itself for amendments and not the
latter.
The 1992 Ghana Constitution came into being after
over a decade of military rule. It could, therefore, be
argued that the absence of honest and prolonged
discussion in the writing of this ‘constitution’ before its
adoption may have represented the views of a few who
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belong to the military class (or pro-PNDC5) with their
authoritative ideology despite several years of constitutional assembly meetings. As a result, 16 years into the
Fourth Republic is considered young in the political
literature. However, it seems to be the ripe time for any
amendments if the ‘constitution’ would be able to stand
the test of the years ahead as Ghana snails into a well
established democracy.
The government must devise new strategies for
managing public programs as it critically evaluates
policies regarding issues like health, education, the
national economy, elections and transportation. With
anticipated growth in the economy and other sectors, it is
obvious that the central government may not be able to
police every sector of the economy at large, especially in
the regions; hence, the importance of decentralization as
discussed earlier in this paper. Most government
bureaucracies in Ghana remain structured and staffed to
manage the traditional pre-independence political
programs with the central government in control of every
activity.
As the country has undeniably accepted democracy as
the way toward viable political and economic development, government strategies and tactics must also
change, especially in its structures and processes in the
area of human resource management. Regrettably, such
a centralized bureaucratic structure as the executive
appointment of leaders in the regions and districts has
not changed significantly in line with democratic
principles. Although the district and regional leaders’
appointments by a president have constitutional backing,
this paper advocates for a constitutional amendment to
allow locals to elect their leaders instead of the central
government. Admittedly, since the 1990s, Ghana has
undergone a steady, but often unnoticed transformation
in terms of its policies toward improved health care,
education, transportation and economic growth. However, in all these sectors, a decentralized management
system could have provided a better sense of local
ownership, which would have led to an improved
maintenance of facilities and government assets as long
as transparency and accountability existed on the part of
the elected.
Local citizens’ direct involvement in electing their
leaders is more likely to improve government efficiency
and responsiveness, which are likely to ensure regional
accountability where the citizens will have the mandate to
replace or retain their leaders through elections based on
the leaders’ performance during their tenure. The election
of DA members and RMs could be scheduled the same
date that the presidential and parliamentary election is
held. Such a constitutional amendment is more likely to
5

Owusu-Ansah (1989) sets the tone of the PNDC and other preparations the
then military government tried to move the country from military to civilian
government. See Owusu-Ansah, David (1986). The Provisional National
Defence Council of Ghana. A move toward consolidation. International Third
World Stud. J. Rev., (1): 213-218.
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diminish the notion of the indirect one party system where
the president appoints DCEs and RMs throughout the
country and those appointees are replaced as soon as
the party in power falls during an election.
CONCLUSION
Despite the comprehensive decentralization policy of the
government since the late 1980s, Ghana is still buried in
a highly centralized top-down public administrative
political system (Ayee, 2008). The little gains made in the
area of decentralization seem to be eroding as partisan
politics take precedence over democratic principles and
local interest. The complexity of public management calls
for the cooperative effort of all the individuals who make
up an administration. The actions and decisions are so
complex with multiple possibilities and changes that it
becomes practically impossible to identify a universally
acceptable definition for public administration (Stillman,
2010).
However, this paper provided a working definition by
drawing on the literature. In discussing decentralization, it
was noted that the theory of decentralization seems
appealing, but one cannot conclude which one Ghana
utilizes as described in the ‘constitution’. Many studies
affirm some progress in implementing decentralization
(Ayee, 2008:255). Ghanaians are in favor of decentralization as a positive method of citizen empowerment
and local economic development, which enjoys both legal
and constitutional guarantees with strong support from
the citizenry.
However, though some scholars argue that
decentralization ensures responsibility, efficiency and
accountability
through
participatory
democracy,
Ghanaians at the regional and district levels are deprived
of these democratic principles; but the requirement for
officeholders to be answerable is at the very root of
representative democracy (Debrah, 2009: 286) where
locals through the democratic process can elect their own
leaders. Therefore, this paper advocates for a
constitutional amendment to allow theoretical democratic
principle to become a reality in Ghana.
The history of decentralization and public administration in Ghana has come with criticisms as the executive
tends to appoint party favorites (The spoils system
concept). Such executive power, as enshrined in the
‘constitution’, does not ensure participatory democracy
“unless the right, interest and involvement… [of]…the
society at large are taken into consideration [through]
elections” (Loh, 2008, 128).
Allowing locals to elect their own political leaders is
more likely to force local public officials to perform since
failing to do so, may result in the electorates rejecting
them in future elections. However, to extend to which
citizens are involved in the local administration of their
constituencies depends on the political leader or the
administration in power.
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